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In this Paper I interpret Charles S. Peirce’s method of prescision as a transcendental 
method. In order to do so, I argue that Peirce’s pragmatism can be interpreted in a 
transcendental light only if we use a non-justificatory understanding of transcendental 
philosophy. I show how Peirce’s prescision is similar to some abstracting procedure that 
Immanuel Kant used in his Critique of Pure Reason. Prescision abstracts from 
experience and thought in general those elements without which such experience and 
thought would be unaccountable. Similarly, in the Aesthetics, Kant isolated the a priori 
forms of intuition by showing how they could be abstracted from experience in general, 
while experience in general cannot be thought without them. However, if Peirce’s and 
Kant’s methods are similar in this respect, they reached very different conclusions. 
Keywords: Charles S. Peirce, Immanuel Kant, Transcendental Philosophy, 
Transcendental Arguments, Pragmatism. 
1. Introduction1 
Even if Peirce has often been read against the background of his Kantian legacy, 
it was Karl Otto Apel who first developed a systematic transcendental interpretation, 
which considered Peirce’s philosophy as both a development and an enhancement of the 
Kantian project2. Since Apel’s book was published there has been some debate about 
the legitimacy of his reading of Peirce. Nowadays, the anti-transcendental interpretation 
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of Peirce is certainly predominant3, even though there have been continuing attempts to 
develop a renewed transcendental consideration of Peirce’s thought4. 
In this study, I aim to contribute to this discussion. I do not wish to argue for 
Apel’s interpretation, but rather to provide a renewed transcendental consideration of 
Peirce, offering an account of transcendental philosophy which is explanatory rather 
than justificatory. First, I will briefly introduce two very different pictures of the 
transcendental method through two distinct interpretations of Kant. I will call these two 
interpretations the ‘justificatory account’ and the ‘alternative account’ of Kant. I will 
suggest that it is this latter, ‘alternative’, account which is closer to Kant’s real aim in 
his critical project. 
After this brief clarification, I will show how Peirce’s method of prescision can 
be read in the light of what I have called the alternative account of Kant. Of course, in 
no way do I want to obscure the novelties which Peirce’s pragmatism brought into 
philosophical discussion. Undoubtedly, Peirce’s philosophy is in many respects 
incompatible with the Kantian project. However, prescision shows important 
similarities with Kant’s procedure of analysis. This means that we can interpret Peirce’s 
philosophy as developing a transcendental method from a quite new perspective. 
Peirce’s method does not need to be justificatory to be interpreted in this way. Finally, I 
will examine the way in which Peirce’s project goes beyond many of the difficulties 
that we find in Kant’s transcendental philosophy.  
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2. Two Ways of  Interpreting Kant 
‘Transcendental’ is often employed in an unclear manner in the literature, and 
some of the senses in which the word is understood certainly cannot be attributed to 
Peirce. I will try to shed light on the way in which I use the word by introducing two 
possible ways of interpreting Kant5. 
I will call the first kind of interpretation the justificatory account of Kant. 
According to this interpretation, Kant was a philosopher who attempted to secure our 
knowledge against the attacks of any potential skeptics. Thus, Kant’s project would 
have tried to answer the problems which Descartes introduced to philosophy, and which 
culminated in Hume’s skepticism. Accordingly, Kant’s aim would have been to 
vindicate the objectivity of our knowledge. His ‘Copernican revolution’ would have 
consisted in his claim that objectivity is warranted as far as outer objects are literally 
products of our minds.  Three features characterize this reading. It holds that Kant: 
 
a) develops a justificatory philosophy which tries to answer the skeptic, 
b) endorses a mentalistic standpoint in which the connection of mental ideas 
to the outer world needs to be vindicated, 
c) provides a strongly deductive strategy based on indubitable first 
premises. 
 
Peter Strawson’s interpretation of Kant is a good example of such a reading6. 
Both the analytic argument that Strawson tries to disentangle from the rest of the 
Critique and the faulty metaphysics that he attributed to Kant share these characteristics. 
It is, however, Kant himself who allows himself to be interpret like this. For example, 
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when Kant stresses that Hume awakened him from his dogmatic slumber7, he suggests 
that one of his main purposes was to answer the Scottish philosopher’s skepticism on 
causation. Obviously, an account of transcendental philosophy constructed like this 
cannot be attributed to Peirce. It would run against Peirce’s anti-foundationalism and his 
fallibilism8. Moreover, this is the very account of the transcendental method against 
which Peirce’s own criticisms are directed9. 
However, Kant also provides the means for interpreting his transcendental 
philosophy in quite a different manner. My purpose here is not to ascertain 
definitatively which interpretation is better, but to find a way to account for 
transcendental philosophy which would be compatible with Peirce’s philosophy. It is 
for this reason that my attention now turns to this alternative way of reading Kant. 
Examples of this interpretation are offered by Henry E. Allison, Graham Bird and 
Arthur Collins10. I will call this second interpretation the alternative account of Kant. 
According to this alternative account, Kant’s first aim was not that of securing human 
knowledge against the doubts that Descartes and the empiricists set against it11. On the 
contrary, Kant understood questioning the validity of our mathematical and empirical 
knowledge to be futile, since in these fields inquirers were not facing any problem at all. 
It was metaphysics that needed a philosophical justification, insofar as it had no 
instrument to settle its everlasting debates (KrV, B vii-xv). In this respect, Kant’s 
philosophy has an important pragmatic character. Kant, just like Charles Peirce, thought 
that doubting our knowledge, and thus making a request for justification, was 
meaningless, unless there was a reason to do so (KrV, A 710-1 B 738-9). The only kind 
of knowledge that Kant questioned was speculative knowledge not grounded in any way 
on experience.  
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Moreover, Kant’s claim that inner and outer representations have equal validity 
seems to leave behind exactly that mentalistic framework which required an anti-
skeptical justification (KrV, A 38 B 55, A 371). It is true that Kant stressed that both 
inner and outer objects were representations, but we have to interpret that claim as 
emphasizing that all objects we can represent possess some features that depend on their 
being in relation to us. This is not the same as saying that all objects are inside our 
minds. 
Following this alternative interpretation, Kant did not even need to provide a 
strongly deductive argument based on indubitable first premises. On the contrary, Kant 
actually began his inquiry taking the fact of human knowledge and experience for 
granted, as they were described both in ordinary practices and the sciences. His aim was 
that of abstracting from such knowledge and experience the elements without which the 
former two would be unaccountable. These are the elements that the object possesses 
only insofar as it is in relation with us. They are features of knowledge and experience 
that depend on their being representative endeavors. For this reason, transcendental 
philosophy inquires into our knowledge and experience, and abstracts those elements 
without which knowledge and experience would be unintelligible as representative 
activities.  
But why would a transcendental project understood in this explanatory way be 
needed? In Kant’s case, his project was a critical undertaking, and specifically a critical 
undertaking directed against the drawbacks of pure philosophy. Accordingly, Kant’s 
first Critique is more concerned with ascertaining the validity of the knowledge claimed 
by dogmatic philosophers than with that claimed by the sciences or common-sense. 
These latter did not need to be validated in so far as they did not produce any apparently 
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insoluble controversy. However, before ascertaining the limits of pure philosophy, a 
task he reserved for the Dialectic, Kant had first to scrutinize human knowledge in order 
to disentangle the a priori structure which functions as a condition of empirical 
knowledge. It is exactly this step of his transcendental project that can be considered 
explanatory. In the Analytic, he took into consideration empirical and mathematical 
knowledge, and he disentangled the a priori structure that only a transcendental inquiry 
could bring to the fore. In fact, Kant considered the main question of his first Critique to 
be: “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” (KrV, B 19). That is to say, he 
never doubted the validity of our mathematical and empirical knowledge. He wanted 
merely to isolate the a priori source of some elements in that knowledge. If he had 
wanted to justify knowledge as such, he would have asked if synthetic a priori 
judgments were possible, not how they were possible. Only after this explanatory 
endeavor was completed could Kant criticize the illegitimate use of the categories in 
metaphysics. 
Of course, the kind of explanation that Kant wanted to provide in his first 
Critique is different from the explanations of other sciences such as physics, chemistry, 
and so forth. What he needs to explain is not a general fact about the world, but our 
ability to provide explanations in science and everyday life. He thus provides a kind of 
second-order investigation on the elements that are common in our knowledge. 
Moreover, Kant did want to inquire into the validity of metaphysical knowledge, and his 
philosophy resulting from this is indirectly validatory of our mathematical and empirical 
knowledge. The implications of Kant’s explanations are thus a lot more complex that 
we might expect, and this can generate misunderstandings. It is important to keep in 
mind, though, that Kant did not develop his explanations because he considered an 
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essential task of philosophy that of justifying our knowledge in general. As we have 
already stressed, Kant considered it superfluous to justify mathematical and empirical 
knowledge, insofar as they were justified by themselves. On the contrary, he developed 
his general picture of the characteristics and scope of human knowledge in order to 
resolve a problem that, for him, was irreparably affecting metaphysics in his times. 
This then, according to the alternative view presented here, is why Kant needed 
such an explanatory step in his system. However, a transcendental philosophy aiming to 
offer an explanation of this kind is not only useful as a preamble toward a critical stance 
on metaphysics, it is also an essential means of clarifying the cognitive structures of our 
knowledge and experience that are not immediately obvious. I think it is this second 
picture of transcendental philosophy which can be attributed to Peirce. This is what I 
will attempt to do in the next section.  
  
3. Peirce’s Transcendental Method 
What I wish to do now is to establish whether Peirce’s philosophy has a 
transcendental character similar to the alternative reading of Kant which I have sketched 
out above. Of course, in those passages where Peirce directly confronts the issue, he 
employs his justificatory interpretation of Kant12. Therefore, we will need to look at his 
system in general in order to discover whether some of its elements and procedures of 
analysis fit our description of the alternative account of Kant and the transcendental 
method. 
Unquestionably, Peirce’s pragmatism inaugurated a new approach to philosophy 
which cannot be reduced or traced back to anybody else in the history of philosophy. 
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Accordingly, it is not for this purpose that I want to compare Peirce with Kant here. I 
wish simply to offer a description of transcendental philosophy which can bring new 
light to some elements of Peirce’s thought and methods, without obscuring the novelties 
of his system and the incompatibilities which separate him from Kant. 
Following the alternative account of Kant, the transcendental method has to be 
considered as an analysis of human experience and knowledge in general in order to 
abstract the fundamental elements, the conditions, without which such experience and 
knowledge would not be possible. We saw that in this undertaking, experience in 
general does not need to be completely neglected in order to preserve the invulnerability 
and absolute validity of the argument. On the contrary, experience in general is the 
departing point from which the analysis must start. 
It is my view that a procedure of this kind can also be detected in Peirce’s 
philosophy, even if he did not link it directly to Kant or to transcendental enterprises. 
This procedure is called prescision and is used by Peirce to show hierarchical 
relationships among concepts and ideas. As such, it is able to abstract the more 
fundamental concepts from the contingent ones. It is the procedure Peirce used to 
discern his categories already in his early attempts. So, in his 1867 paper ‘A New List 
of Categories’, prescision is described like this: 
 
The terms ‘prescision’ and ‘abstraction’, which were formerly applied to every kind of 
separation, are now limited, not merely to mental separation, but to that which arises from 
attention to one element and neglect of the other. […] I can prescind red from blue, and space 
from color […]; but I cannot prescind color from space, nor red from color. […] Prescision is 
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not a reciprocal process. It is frequently the case, that, while A cannot be prescinded from B, B 
can be prescinded from A (W 2:50-1). 
 
In this manner, prescision is able to show hierarchical relationships among 
concepts. It shows which concept is necessary to think the other, insofar as the former is 
involved in the latter. For that reason, color can be prescinded from red, but red cannot 
be prescinded from color. In fact, one cannot think red without thinking it as a kind of 
color. On the contrary, one can think the concept of color in general without reference 
to any particular one. It has to be kept in mind that the kind of hierarchical relationships 
that prescision aims to discern are not psychological. Saying that I can prescind color 
from red is not the same as saying that I cannot have in my mind the idea of red without 
having also the idea of color. It shows a logical involvement or independence. 
Accordingly, the concept that is prescindable from the other shows a logical 
independence which gives it a higher place in the hierarchical order13. 
However, if prescision is adapted for abstracting some concepts from others, 
thus showing a hierarchical order among them, how could it be useful in a 
transcendental inquiry? Prescision becomes philosophically relevant when it is applied 
not simply to organizing a set of ordinary concepts, but rather to disentangling the 
fundamental concepts which account for our experience and thought. In fact, it is for 
this purpose that Peirce clarified the method of prescision. He used it to abstract his 
three categories and to shed light on the relationships among them. To do this, he 
applied prescision to experience and thought in general, attempting to isolate those 
elements without which such experience and thought would have been unaccountable. 
Thus, in reference to experience as a whole, prescision can show ‘that the elements 
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conjoined cannot be supposed without the conception, whereas the conception can 
generally be supposed without these elements’ (W 2:51). That is, in order to discern 
those elements that are fundamental for explaining our experience, I have to take into 
consideration experience in general and isolate those elements which can be prescinded 
from the rest. Thus, if these elements were actually fundamental they could be 
prescinded from experience, whereas experience could never be prescinded from 
them14. 
So, Peirce used prescision to isolate his categories from the rest of experience 
and thought because it was able to detect a conceptual relationship that was not 
reciprocal. When applied to experience and thought in general this kind of logical 
analysis can isolate those elements that were necessary to account for such experience 
and thought. If we come back to Kant, and in particular to his argument for the a priori 
nature of time, we discover a similar line of reasoning. 
 
In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the 
appearances away from time (KrV, A 31 B 46)15. 
 
Kant is suggesting that if we take into consideration our experience in general, 
we can consider time regardless of particular phenomena, while experience in general 
cannot be thought of without time16. A similar position is reserved for the unity of 
apperception. Without the unity of apperception, it would not be possible to think of any 
unity in experience17. Thus, experience in general cannot prescind from that original 
unity, while we can consider the unity of apperception prescinding from particular 
experience. With this kind of argumentative procedure, Kant is providing an analysis of 
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human experience and knowledge in line with what we have called the alternative 
account18. He did not begin by seeking indubitable premises for facing skeptical 
challenges: no absolutely certain starting point was at issue. The object that Kant had to 
account for was human knowledge in general, without questioning its validity at any 
moment. To elucidate this object, Kant undertook an abstracting procedure that was 
quite similar to Peirce’s method of prescision. He tried to isolate those elements without 
which human experience would have been inexplicable, and, to achieve this, he isolated 
those elements which could be thought of without a reference to particular experience, 
but without which particular experience could not remain as it is19. 
Kant’s method of abstraction and Peirce’s prescision thus share strong 
similarities. Of course it remains the case that Kant’s and Peirce’s purposes were really 
different when they tried to disentangle the fundamental categories of thought from the 
rest of our knowledge. Kant wanted to offer a general picture of human knowledge able 
to recognize its a priori elements. Moreover, he wanted to lay down the precise limits of 
a priori reasoning. On the contrary, Peirce, with his categories, wanted to clarify the 
elements that partake in the ongoing development of human thought and knowledge. 
Peirce did this to provide tools which can enhance our ability as inquirers. For Peirce 
philosophy was not an armchair endeavor, but was the task of inquirers who had their 
own distinct contribution to make to the development of the sciences. As a 
consequence, Peirce’s categories remain vague and are always evolving according to the 
historical situation in which they are determined.  
These differences notwithstanding, Kant’s method of abstracting the categories 
and Peirce’s prescision share important similarities. If this is true, it means that Peirce’s 
prescision, when applied to thought and experience in general, can legitimately be 
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considered a piece of transcendental inquiry. As Kant did in his first Critique, Peirce 
took into consideration human knowledge and experience in general without any 
justificatory antiskeptical aim20. Peirce praised Kant’s doctrine of immediate perception, 
just in so far as it did not ask for any justification of our concepts of objects21. It 
considered our representations of outer objects not to be inferred from inner sensation, 
but to be immediately external. Peirce thought that this doctrine was actually in contrast 
to the ideas Kant pursued in his transcendental project. However, following the 
alternative account of Kant’s philosophy which we have developed, this is not so. To 
the extent that, without that objective assumption, Kant could not begin his abstractive 
inquiry on human knowledge, this doctrine was completely in accordance with his 
transcendental method. Following exactly this account of human experience and 
knowledge, in which no priority is reserved for inner sensations and ideas22, Peirce 
could undertake his prescisive analysis of human thought. Human knowledge and 
thought, with their claims of objectivity, could be coherently taken as a starting point 
for Peirce’s prescisive enterprise.  
These were Peirce’s objects and methods of study in his 1867 paper ‘A New List 
of Categories’. It could be argued that Peirce later abandoned the viewpoint of this 
paper and moved toward a totally new line of reasoning23. However, even if Peirce 
certainly did renounce the attempt to explain how we ‘reduce the manifold of sensuous 
impressions to unity’ (W 2:49), it is beyond question that prescision remained a 
fundamental method of arguing even after the development of his phenomenology and 
phaneroscopy. Moreover, in line with his 1867 paper, his phenomenology had to take 
on the complexity of human thought as it was manifested in human ordinary experience 
and in the sciences, and try to abstract by prescision the fundamental elements necessary 
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to account for that object of study. In 1905, regarding his phenomenology he stressed 
that ‘all that we need is to get an idea of what the general structure of the 
indecomposable elements of thought is’ (MS 284: p. 3424), and, in the same paper, he 
still recognized prescision as an essential tool in order to bring forward the separation of 
those indecomposable elements (MS 284: pp. 72-3, 76-7). By indecomposable elements 
he meant those features of our thought that could not be reduced to simpler concepts 
without losing their proper meaning. As such, they are just the kind of fundamental 
elements that a prescisive analysis must abstract. Accordingly, probably just one year 
earlier he claimed: 
 
The work of discovery of the phenomenologist […] consists in disentangling, or drawing out, 
from human thought, certain threads that run through it, and in showing what marks each has 
that distinguish it from every other (NEM 4:196). 
 
In point of fact, the prescisive analysis that Peirce inaugurated in his 1867 paper 
‘A New List of Categories’ plays a central role even in the phenomenology he 
developed after 1902. In accordance with our account of the transcendental method, 
Peirce’s phenomenology aimed exactly at isolating those elements which had an 
essential role in our experience and thought. In addition, there is a further point of 
continuity with Kant’s abstractive procedure. Both Kant and Peirce, in order to separate 
and isolate what they thought to be essential elements of thought and knowledge, 
focused on the form25, not on the matter, of representations. Peirce, accordingly, argued: 
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Matter is that by virtue of which an object gains Existence, a fact known only by an Index, 
which is connected with the object only by brute force; while Form, being that by which the 
object is such as it is, is comprehensible. It follows that, assuming that there are any 
indecomposable constituents of the Phaneron, since each of these, has a definite Valency, […] 
this is the only Form, or, at any rate, the only intelligible Form, the Elements of the Phaneron 
can have, the Classification of elements of the Phaneron must, in the first place, be classified 
according to Valency (NEM 4:322). 
 
By analyzing thought and experience as they are manifest in human practices, 
phenomenology, or phaneroscopy, aims to abstract that structure of concepts that is 
necessary to account for those human practices. In order to do that, it focuses on that 
formal relational structure without which human thought would not be what it is. 
If I am right, then Peirce’s method of prescision, when applied to thought and 
experience in general, can be considered as a kind of transcendental inquiry in line with 
the alternative picture of the transcendental method. Accordingly, in order for it to be 
considered in a transcendental manner, it is not required that prescision should doubt the 
validity of our knowledge until it is founded upon a solid argument, which argument 
must be based on a self-sustaining proposition. On the contrary, prescision can start its 
analysis from human knowledge as it is developed either in human everyday practices 
or in the sciences. With this object to account for, it has to abstract those formal 
elements which find a peculiar place in thought, that is, those elements that thought 
itself cannot prescind from. Having found in Peirce a line of thought that is comparable 
to Kant’s transcendental project (if the latter is understood following the alternative 
account), we have now to analyze the peculiar way in which he developed those ideas. 
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In fact, the purposes that guided the development of Peirce’s pragmatism are really 
different from those of Kant. This resulted in a renewed set of problems and solutions. 
Thus, if we can consider Peirce’s prescision in a transcendental light, we must also 
consider how Peirce developed this transcendental kind of argumentation in a totally 
new way according to his pragmatism. 
 
3.1. Peirce’s Transcendental Elements 
As I have suggested, Peirce’s own idea of a transcendental project was in 
accordance with the justificatory account of Kant. Accordingly, Peirce thought that in 
order to develop a transcendental demonstration of his categories he had to use the only 
kind of a priori reasoning that he permitted, that is: mathematical demonstration. Thus, 
Peirce believed he needed to obtain positive philosophical truths about our experience 
and thought, from a pure mathematical deduction based on previously established self-
sustaining propositions. In his classification, this would have meant directly deriving 
philosophical knowledge from a mathematical course of reasoning26. That would have 
been quite close to a Cartesian line of reasoning, where a supposedly pure a priori 
argument, developed through a series of valid deductive steps, guarantees some truths 
about our experience of an external world.  
However, following the alternative account of Kant, Kant’s starting point was 
not an indubitable proposition, but consisted of human experience and knowledge found 
in ordinary life and the sciences. Consequently, in order to uncover a transcendental 
approach in Peirce’s system, we do not need to find an argument that directly derives 
truths about experience from mathematical reasoning. Peirce did not need to derive 
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truths in phenomenology and logic directly from mathematics. On the contrary, he just 
needed to show that some elements of experience and thought, which a philosophical 
consideration brings to attention, can be prescinded from such experience and thought 
in general, while the opposite operation is not possible. If a mathematical consideration 
is capable of teaching something important about those fundamental elements (in fact, it 
is by means of the logic of relatives that Peirce argues for his categories), it only means 
that the purely relational form which mathematics describes is more fundamental with 
respect to the particular determination it gains phenomenologically. This is completely 
different from requiring that phenomenological determinations have to be directly 
derived from the pure mathematical forms. For example, the purely mathematical 
representation of a triadic relation in a diagram is surely prescindable from the 
determination that that form gains in a sign. However, this need not imply that the 
determination of thirdness in sign use must be directly derived from diagrammatic 
reasoning. Again, prescision is just what we need in order to consider thought in 
general, bracketing what is not fundamental and focusing on its essential constituents. 
In this passage, where Peirce is explaining to Victoria Lady Welby the purpose and 
method of his phenomenology, a science he will later call phaneroscopy, but that is here 
referred to as ideoscopy, it is clear how the method of this science is that of considering 
human experience in general and trying to put into brackets what is not of interest for it.  
 
Ideoscopy consists in describing and classifying the ideas that belong to ordinary experience or 
that naturally arise in connection with ordinary life, without regard to their being valid or 
invalid or to their psychology (SS, 24). 
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Here phenomenology well exemplifies what the transcendental procedure of 
Peirce is like. It considers experience as it is normally conceived and tries to abstract 
those elements more relevant for its analysis. Thus, phenomenology can be considered 
from a transcendental perspective even if it cannot be directly derived from 
mathematics. This is not to say that Peirce’s prescision is merely a duplication of Kant’s 
transcendental approach. On the contrary, Peirce reinvents transcendental philosophy in 
a pragmatic context. As we shall see, Peirce is able to abstract some fundamental 
features of our thinking, without imposing any fixed structure on our knowledge. This is 
possible because Peirce’s transcendental elements are indeterminate and thus are 
capable of evolution, according to the different historical situations in which they are 
determined.   
If non-justificatory transcendental enterprises stand out for beginning their 
analyses from experience as it is generally conceived, we have to establish how Peirce’s 
philosophy undertook this general survey. We saw that Kant’s first object of study was 
human knowledge as it was developed in ordinary and scientific representations. For 
Peirce, the immediate object for philosophical analysis was human thought and the 
semiotic processes to which it normally gives rise. Thus, in its study of experience and 
thought, philosophy tries first of all to abstract their semiotic structure27. Human 
semiosis constitutes exactly that immediately objective domain of knowledge and 
experiences that Peirce’s transcendental enterprise needs to account for. The normative 
sciences and phenomenology, by means of succeeding prescisive steps, abstract from 
that semiotic whole the fundamental elements a transcendental analysis is intended to 
bring to the surface. 
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Within philosophy, it is phenomenology which indicates those elements that can 
be prescinded from any other. Accordingly, it presents the elements that are the most 
fundamental in order to account for the semiotic structure philosophy has to disentangle. 
Thus, with the help of the logic of relatives, phenomenology analyzes that complex of 
semiotic processes which human thought consists of, and attempts to isolate the most 
fundamental and necessary elements within such thought, that is, Peirce’s three 
categories. 
 
It can further be said in advance, not, indeed, purely a priori but with the degree of apriority that 
is proper to logic, namely, as a necessary deduction from the fact that there are signs, that there 
must be an elementary triad (CP 1.292). 
 
Evidently, for Peirce, a purely a priori deduction would have been one of the 
kind justificatory accounts ask for, that is, one developed from a certainly valid premise. 
But, according to our picture of the transcendental method, Peirce’s categories can 
indeed be considered a priori, since experience would be unaccountable without them, 
while they can be prescinded from particular experience. They can be considered a 
priori even if our first object of study needs to be semiotic processes as they are 
manifest in human practices28. 
Peirce calls his categories firstness, secondness and thirdness. As these terms 
suggest, it is not really easy to grasp or exemplify what Peirce means by them. They are 
so general that they should account for every possible relation in thought, knowledge, 
objective reality, and so forth. To put it in simple terms, firstness refers to the mere 
presentation of a quality, or, alternatively, to the nature of a subject regardless of any 
 19 
relation with something else; secondess refers to direct and dynamic relations between 
two subjects, as for example in cause-effect relations; to finish, thirdness refers to a kind 
of relations in which the mediation of a third term is necessary, as for example in 
meaning and sign use. Peirce considers these three categories to be able to account for 
every kind of relation we might find in our thinking and knowledge, as well as in the 
objective world. 
In order to bring out this a priori relational structure of experience and thought, 
phenomenology has to look into the semiotic whole of our representative practices, 
prescinding from the particular way in which meaning is conveyed and developed. 
Thus, phenomenology takes into consideration semiotic processes and tries to consider 
them on a more abstract level, prescinding even from the special features that render a 
sign a sign. Phenomenology thus sheds light on the necessary relational basis on which 
even signification rests. The question on what is peculiar in the triadic relation of 
signification is not a matter for phenomenology, even if, focusing on human 
representations, its first objects of study are inevitably semiotic processes of thought. 
Prescinding from the determinations that triadic, dyadic and monadic relations gain in 
sign processes, phenomenology also abstracts from the question of the validity of signs. 
That is, it does not take into consideration whether the representations are dreams, 
illusions, or truthful knowledge29. It simply looks into the complex of human semiotic 
processes and tries to abstract their fundamental relational structure, described by the 
categories. Thus, the categories, in order to be considered in a transcendental fashion, 
need not function as a mathematical starting point from which phenomenological and 
semiotic determination are directly derived. On the contrary, they just need to be 
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prescinded from the semiotic whole that characterizes human practices, while showing 
that that semiotic whole cannot prescind from them30. 
Peirce’s phenomenological categories are thus the most fundamental elements of 
thought and shed light on its essential relational structure. They can thus be considered 
in a transcendental light, following our non-justificatory reconstruction of the 
transcendental method. As transcendental elements, they offer a basis for explaining the 
way in which that fundamental relational structure is determined in other branches of 
philosophy, namely, the normative sciences and metaphysics31.  
However, I think there are some other elements in Peirce’s philosophy that can 
also be considered transcendental, even if their relational structure can be accounted for 
only by means of the categories. These elements are the esthetic ideal and the regulative 
hopes. I think they need to be considered as being transcendental principles because 
they take a particular perspective on sign processes, a perspective that is typical of 
Peirce’s methodeutic. This perspective is not limited to a general outline of the 
fundamental elements of experience and thought, but attempts to isolate those elements 
that are necessary actually to bring forward sign processes32. The esthetic ideal and the 
regulative hopes thus identify those principles that are necessary for engagement in 
actual courses of inference and investigation in order to reach the purpose in view. In 
this respect, the esthetic ideal, which is identified by Peirce’s esthetics, accounts for the 
normativity of our feeling, acting and thinking. We judge our feeling to be beautiful, our 
actions to be right, our inferences to be sound, in reference to an ideal, and we seek to 
be consistent and coherent in these judgments. The esthetic ideal accounts also for the 
systematicity we seek in our inquiries. On the other hand, the regulative hopes, which 
are identified by Peirce’s methodeutic, suggest the hypothesis that we must endorse 
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when engaged in a process of thinking, that is, the hypothesis that the problem at hand 
does allow for a solution. Peirce thought that it was impossible for us to obtain a 
warrant that we would eventually get to know what we are inquiring into. However, we 
could not even engage in a process of inquiry if we did not endorse a regulative hope in 
the possibility of our success. By applying prescision even to these principles, they can 
be considered transcendental because they can be prescinded from the actual courses of 
investigation that they aim to account for, while those courses of investigation cannot be 
prescinded from them, that is, they would be unaccountable without these principles33. 
Using a Kantian distinction to analyze Peirce’s categories (firstness, secondness 
and thirdness), esthetic ideal and regulative hopes, we could say that the categories lie in 
the middle between constitutive and regulative principles. They can be considered to be 
constitutive in so far as they are present in every phenomenon; they can be considered 
to be regulative, in so far as they cannot teach anything determinate on experience 
before they gain a particular a posteriori determination. As a priori categories, they just 
offer a vague picture of what experience is like, but it is only particular experience and 
particular sign processes that determine them. On the contrary, the esthetic ideal and the 
regulative hopes are surely regulative principles, in as much as they offer only a guide 
for the development of signs, without furnishing any guarantee that these principles will 
bring a fruitful result. Nonetheless, they are necessary principles in order to account for 
that process of development. 
These then are the transcendental elements that we can obtain from our 
transcendental consideration of Peirce’s philosophy. We saw that to consider those 
elements a priori we do not need totally to neglect experience and a posteriori 
knowledge providing a purely deductive and derivative argument. On the contrary, the 
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total of human semiotic processes is the first object we need to account for, abstracting 
those elements these processes cannot prescind from.  
One might ask what we gain in considering Peirce’s categories, esthetic ideal 
and regulative hopes in this transcendental light. First of all, we are able to distinguish 
the prescisive method Peirce uses to abstract these elements from other kind of 
abstractions. Thus, we can account for the hierarchization of elements in our thinking 
that Peirce brought forward in his philosophy. As we have seen, the purpose of this 
hierarchization need not be justificatory in order to be considered transcendental. It 
must be kept in mind, though, that in Peirce’s pragmatic philosophy this hierachization 
is not a purpose in itself, but is an irreplaceable means to improve our capacity to 
reason, and to facilitate the way in which we gain new knowledge. In this respect, 
Peirce developed transcendental philosophy in a totally new perspective, in accordance 
with his pragmatism. We could also ask how a transcendental inquiry could enhance our 
reasoning. It is exactly the clarification of the fundamental elements that partake in the 
development of our knowledge which shows its pragmatic usefulness in Peirce’s 
philosophical edifice. In fact, by isolating what is fundamental for the development of 
our thought we can better identify what is not so essential and could block the road of 
inquiry.  
Now we must consider what distinguishes Peirce’s transcendental project, and 
renders it a more satisfying and successful account than Kant’s. 
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3.2. The Novelties and Advantages of Peirce’s Project 
Nowadays, Peirce scholarship often insists on the differences between Peirce’s 
pragmatism and Kant’s transcendental philosophy. This is justifiable because by 
interpreting Peirce in the light of Kant one risks failing to grasp what is genuinely 
original in the thought of the father of pragmatism. When considering our knowledge, 
Peirce does not only seek to provide a general account of our ways of understanding and 
explaining things, he also seeks to offer tools to develop our knowledge further. It is for 
this reason that his philosophy is genuinely methodological, putting an important 
emphasis on development and growth34. Accordingly, Peirce’s categories do not 
themselves teach anything determinate on experience, but rather leave open the 
possibility of endless development. In an epoch in which the historicity of scientific 
discoveries in general demands attention, a philosophical account which does not need 
to anticipate something determinate about experience is surely of benefit. Thus, even if 
necessary, Peirce’s categories provide only a very general and vague description of the 
features of experience and thought, that have no specific connotation unless they are 
determined in a particular way by the context. It was not so in Kant’s project, which 
wished to teach something determinate about the general structure of experience35. No 
particular law, as for example the law of causality, is imposed upon nature by Peirce’s 
categories. They just offer a general, really vague, outline of the structural necessities 
pertaining to our representations. Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness are the kind of 
relations meaningful representations cannot prescind from. Thus, Peirce scholars such 
as Short36 and Midtgarden37 are surely right in emphasizing this important distinction 
between Peirce and Kant’s thought. Peirce’s pragmatism possesses a relevance for the 
ongoing development of human practices that is unknown in Kant’s philosophy. 
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However, I think that what we brought out concerning prescision does enable us to 
grasp that these novelties of Peirce’s thought are not totally in contrast to Kant, but are a 
way to develop transcendental philosophy in a more pragmatic and productive manner. 
In fact, concerning Peirce’s categories, even if no determinate anticipation of experience 
is possible by means of them, prescision shows nonetheless that they are essential 
features of our experience and thought38. 
Even if this is an important perspective on Peirce’s philosophy in relation to 
Kant, and even if in other respects Peirce advances our understanding significantly 
beyond Kant, there is a further advantage that his approach to the categories offers, 
which can make an important new contribution to contemporary philosophy: 
transcendental philosophy can be understood in a compelling new way if it is developed 
in a pragmatic context. One of the most questionable features of Kant’s system is the 
separation, if not the opposition, between the domains of theory and practice, between 
the determinism of the natural world and the freedom of human agency. Thus, if 
according to the categories and the forms of intuition, nature, as a phenomenon, is 
absolutely determined by Newtonian laws, then human behavior is subject to freedom, 
finding its ground in the noumenal self.  
It is just this opposition between theory and practice, between an absolutely 
determined phenomenal nature and a free noumenal self that Peirce allows us to avoid. 
So many scholars have correctly insisted on this feature of Peirce’s thought to 
emphasize his distance from a Kantian perspective39. According to his pragmatism, 
practical features are intrinsically part of our theoretical endeavors40, and theoretical 
characters take part in the self-corrective considerations by which we direct our 
behavior41. In Peirce’s system, the categories through which we must think our 
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experience leave room for freedom even in our representation of nature. Accordingly, 
the picture of nature Peirce developed in his metaphysics is intended to show how 
chance variations, indeterminacy, and purposeful development are characters that are 
not only applicable to human behavior, but also to nature itself. Peirce’s metaphysics 
tries to demonstrate that the categories which are necessary to account for our 
representation of objects are also categories of being – considered in the latter’s 
independence of thought42.  What is important here is that the picture of nature that the 
categories of thought require is a representation not restricted to deterministic laws. In 
this way, following Peirce’s suggestion, human purposeful behavior is explicable by 
means of the same categories as nature is. 
The insight that human beings and nature are thinkable along the same path 
opens up a completely fresh trajectory in Peirce’s system. Metaphysics is intended to 
show that nature, in its independency from thought, is also triadic and purposive. As far 
as human beings are part of that nature, they can be seen as determined by the laws and 
tendencies proper to it. Thus, two lines of dependency can be simultaneously thought 
within Peirce’s system. The former is the dependency of our representation of nature on 
the categorical structure of our thinking; the latter is the dependence of human beings 
on the nature they are part of. Peirce’s perspective is thus able to think nature and 
human beings as being in continuity. This is impossible to do along the lines of Kant’s 
philosophy. The rules that govern human practical behavior are totally different form 
the rules of nature. In this respect, Peirce is totally beyond Kant’s standpoint and 
nobody would dispute that.  
However, what needs to be emphasized is that when Peirce is concerned with the 
dependency of our representation of nature on the categorical structure of our thinking 
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he can still be considered as proposing a kind of transcendental inquiry, in so far as it 
attempts to isolate those elements that are necessary for our representation of objects. 
On the contrary, the dependency of human beings, and of their ways of thinking, on the 
nature they are part of clearly surpasses the limits of this transcendental speculation, 
trying to go beyond our representative thinking43. The picture of human beings and 
nature that we obtain following this illustration has numerous advantages. We can 
coherently think of a reciprocal determination between human subjects and nature, in 
which human subjects determine their representation of nature thanks to the categorical 
structure of their thinking. However, if nature possesses the same categorical structure 
of thought, that could mean that our thinking in this way depends on our being part of 
nature itself. Peirce’s principle of continuity is thus preserved. Human beings and nature 
are part of the same whole and are not discontinuously governed by different laws44. 
There is not any sharp separation between the causally determinate laws of nature and 
the indeterminate freedom of human beings. Having said that, it must be borne in mind 
that Peirce’s transcendental analysis of the fundamental elements of our representational 
thinking must come before any hypothesis on nature in its independency. 
The possibility of thinking of this reciprocal dependency within the conceptual 
framework of Peirce’s system renders it a fruitful viewpoint even with respect to 
contemporary philosophy45. Moreover, it shows that in perspectives that recognize the 
continuity of human beings with the rest of nature there can be still room for 




In this paper I have described two different ways of interpreting Kant and, 
accordingly, two different accounts of the aims and methods of transcendental 
philosophy. I have stressed that Peirce cannot be interpreted in a transcendental fashion 
if the transcendental method is understood in line with what I have called the 
justificatory account of Kant. We can interpret Peirce transcendentally only if we use a 
picture of transcendental philosophy along the lines of the alternative interpretation of 
Kant here presented. Accordingly, Peirce, in order to be considered in a transcendental 
way, does not need to claim a justification of our knowledge or a definitive anti-
skeptical outcome for his doctrines. Neither does Peirce need to provide a strong 
deductive argument based on self-sustaining indubitable propositions, an argument able 
to prove the validity of our knowledge of outer object, departing from a mentalistic 
perspective on our inner ideas. 
On the contrary, a transcendental inquiry in the alternative sense here presented 
needs only to consider experience and knowledge as they are normally determined in 
our ordinary and scientific practices. This ‘datum’ needs not to be vindicated or 
founded, but is the departing point from which a transcendental inquiry has to abstract 
those elements without which such experience and knowledge would not be 
understandable. Of course, these elements have to depend on our representative 
standpoint on the objects. 
Peirce’s prescision, when applied to experience and thought in general, shows 
strong similarities to this way of accounting for the transcendental method. It considers 
experience and thought, and abstracts those elements without which experience and 
thought would not be intelligible. It also shows that, conversely, we can refer to those 
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elements without needing to consider particular experience and thought. Moreover, 
those elements are immediately related to the necessity of representing objects by means 
of signs. Thus, it is through prescision that Peirce can be interpreted in a transcendental 
fashion. 
Finally, this paper emphasized how this transcendental interpretation of Peirce’s 
philosophy does not prevent the recognition of important novelties and advantages in 
his thought. First of all, Peirce’s system of transcendental elements shows 
methodological purports that are unknown to Kant’s critical project. Moreover, Peirce is 
able to avoid Kant’s sharp division between nature and freedom. In fact, Peirce’s 
categories do not require that nature and freedom are thought of as two opposite realms. 
Peirce’s categories allow the concept of freedom to be given room in our conception of 
nature, and thus, also,  allow us to think of nature and the self as being in continuity. 
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as a whole, the categories and the a priori forms of intuitions are not prescindable with respect to 
experience in general. Thus, if the purpose is that of accounting for the whole of experience, the cognitive 
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position by declaring that all relations are illusive appearances, since it is not merely true knowledge of 
them that he has cut off but every mode of cognitive representation of them’ (EP 2:155). 
22 In accordance with this idea, Peirce attacked Descartes for his attempt to set a universal doubt on 
human knowledge as a departing point in his philosophy (W 2:212). For Peirce, that doubt was a ‘paper 
doubt’, since it could not be a real doubt. This is a consequence of the immediate objective validity of our 
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23 Thomas Short advances this reading. He stresses that Peirce abandoned the deductive strategy of the 
new list for the inductive investigation of his phenomenology (Short, 2007: p. 31). 
24 MS refers to Peirce’s manuscripts. I indicate manuscript number (according to: Robin, 1967) and page 
number (I follow, when possible, Peirce’s own paging). 
25 William Rosensohn stresses that Peirce’s phenomenology does not provide this priority to form 
(Rosensohn, 1974: pp. 24-5). 
26 In MS 908 Peirce attempts an a priori derivation of the categories. However, he stresses that this 
derivation cannot be considered transcendental, because we cannot directly derive truths about objects 
from mathematical a priori reasoning based on a self-sustaining proposition. See: (EP 2:363-6).  This idea 
of a transcendental deduction is very close to the one we have attributed to justificatory accounts of Kant. 
27 In this picture, metaphysics, the third department of Peirce’s philosophy has to come later, trying to 
demonstrate that the semiotic structure of thought is doubled in reality, this latter considered in its 
independency from thought. This account of metaphysics could recall a typical philosophical problem of 
idealistic positions which characterizes even the justificatory account of the transcendental method, that is 
the problem of proving that our inner ideas really match reality. However, this is not Peirce’s problem. He 
did not need to guarantee that our representations correspond to reality. As we saw, according to the 
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representational character notwithstanding. 
28 Accordingly, Kant stresses that all of our knowledge begins with experience. However, that does not 
mean that it totally depends on particular experience (KrV, B 1). 
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35 It could be stressed that Kant’s categories are also indeterminate and vague before their schematization. 
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see: (Colapietro, 2006). Colapietro stresses that Peirce abandoned the formal account of practical identity 
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42 This metaphysical step is totally in contrast to Kant’s project and not part of what we stressed is 
Peirce’s transcendental philosophy. 
43 Two points have to be noted here. First: Peirce did not need this step toward an explanation of nature in 
its independency for guaranteeing the objectivity of our representation. As we saw, Peirce did not doubt 
this objectivity and considered our perception directly valid. Our knowledge cannot but be in signs and it 
is in this framework that we have to stress objectivity. He needed this metaphysical step just to explain 
how our thought is pragmatically valid to account for nature. Second: he was aware of the fact that every 
hypothesis on nature in its independency could not but be developed within our semiotic framework. 
However, the particular way in which natural phenomena are arranged in our knowledge can allow a 
hypothesis, just a hypothesis, on what they need to have in common with our representative practices. 
44 Karl Otto Apel also addresses this continuity between mind and nature (Apel, 1995). However, he does 
not recognize that it is just because Peirce’s categories allow room for freedom that this continuity is 
possible.  
45 Peirce’s viewpoint is able to accomplish what John McDowell asks for when he states: ‘If we can 
rethink our conception of nature so as to make room for spontaneity, even though we deny that 
spontaneity is capturable by the resources of bald naturalism, we shall by the same token be rethinking 
our conception of what it takes for a position to deserve to be called ‘naturalism’’ (McDowell, 1996: p. 
77). 
46 In this sense Peirce’s position can also be considered a naturalistic project. An attempt to develop a 
naturalistic version of transcendental philosophy along the lines of pragmatism is provided by Sami 
Pihlström (2003). 
